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Corporate, Securities and Banking Law Aspects
of Workouts
BOWMAN BROWN,* BRIAN NORDWALL** AND MICHAEL L. ASHNER***
A corporate workout is any arrangement involving a volun-
tary restructuring of a debtor-creditor relationship for the pur-
pose of avoiding foreclosure or bankruptcy. The authors discuss
certain provisions of Florida's General Corporation Act, Banking
Act and securities laws, together with pertinent federal securities
laws, to illustrate methods for creating such arrangements. In
addition, potential hazards are discussed, with the authors pro-
viding useful suggestions for planning and litigation purposes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The range and variety of transactions that may be realistically
defined as "workouts" is enormous. For the limited purposes of this
article, a workout is defined as any arrangement involving a volun-
tary restructuring of a debtor-creditor relationship for the purpose
of avoiding foreclosure or bankruptcy. Aside from the debtor and
creditor, many other parties may be involved. While the workout
process is basically extra-judicial, litigation may occur either as a
result of the particular agreement or because the parties fail to reach
an amicable settlement of their differences.
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For the purpose of analysis, the workout process may be broken
down into phases. The first phase, the negotiation stage, begins with
the realization that the enterprise is in trouble. Here, each party
analyzes its own liabilities and defenses. Both debtors and creditors
search for third parties against whom liability may be asserted. An
actual workout situation cannot occur, however, unless all parties
affected by the arrangement find the solution to be mutually advan-
tageous.
At this point, the second, or implementation stage occurs. By
the time the second stage begins, the parties have decided to re-
structure their relationship so that the enterprise may continue,
hopefully on a profitable course. During this phase, the provisions
of applicable state and federal securities and banking laws are cru-
cial and must be examined carefully. This article will reveal the
dynamics of these two stages and provide useful suggestions for
avoiding potential pitfalls.
II. CERTAIN FLORIDA GENERAL CORPORATION ACT CONSIDERATIONS IN
THE NEGOTIATION OF WORKOUTS
A. Prohibited Disbursements
Once it has become clear that a project is in trouble, parties
controlling the debtor entity may attempt to limit their exposure by
reducing their financial stake in the entity. Counsel to both debtor
and creditor parties in a potential workout situation should be
aware that such activities may run afoul of various provisions of the
new Florida General Corporation Act.'
The Act provides that a corporation may only repurchase
shares out of and to the extent of an "unreserved and unrestricted
surplus."' Similar restrictions apply to the payment of dividends.3
The new Act does not delineate whether the computation of surplus,
which is available for the payment of dividends and redemptions,
may be made from consolidated financial statements (as are com-
mon in the case of public and more substantial private corporations)
or whether each corporate entity considering a distribution must
make the computations based upon its own individual unconsoli-
dated financial statements. Regardless of which rule controls, it
appears that the end result will be the same because the controlling
1. The Florida General Corporation Act, assigned a chapter 607 designation, was enacted
in 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-250, and supersedes FLA. STAT. §§ 608.01-.77, 613.01-.11 (1973)(as
amended).
2. FLA. STAT. § 607.017(1) (1977).
3. Id.' § 607.137.
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measure in Florida is a balance sheet test rather than one based on
earnings.'
The valuation of assets, for the purpose of computing the sur-
plus available for a proper distribution, continues to present a prob-
lem under the new Florida General Corporation Act. "Surplus" is
defined in the new Act as the excess of "net assets" over "stated
capital."5 "Net assets" means the amount by which the total assets
of a corporation exceed the total liabilities of the corporation., Un-
answered is the question of whether the book or the market value
of a corporation's assets is to be utilized in computing "net asset"
value.7 There is some authority under the former section 608.13 to
the effect that "actual market value" of assets may be employed.,
The new Act also requires that restrictions and reservations
upon surplus must be deducted from "surplus" which would other-
wise be available to a corporation for the payment of dividends or
the redemption of its shares.' The restrictions and reservations
which must be taken into account are not apparent without careful
inspection of the new Act. In this context, a corporation may, by
resolution of its board of directors, create a reserve or reserves out
of its earned surplus for any proper purpose and may abolish any
such reserve in the same manner."° To the extent that earned sur-
plus or capital surplus is used as the measure of the right of the
corporation to purchase its own shares, such surplus is restricted so
long as the shares purchased are held as treasury shares." The re-
striction is allocated on a pro rata basis to the treasury shares, and
upon the disposition or cancellation of any such shares, the corre-
sponding pro rata restriction is removed.'
The new Act prohibits a corporation from purchasing or paying
for its own shares at a time when the corporation is insolvent or
when such payment would make it insolvent.'3 Similarly, the pay-
ment of a dividend is prohibited if it would result in the insolvency
4. Id. § 607.137(1) provides: "Dividends in cash or property may be declared and paid
.. .only out of the unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus of the corporation or out of
capital surplus, howsoever arising. ... The statute does not permit payment of dividends
out of current earnings when the stated capital is impaired.
5. Id. § 607.004(11).
6. Id. § 607.004(9).
7. Id.
8. See Baxter v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 324
F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1963), which applied the now outmoded "assets less liabilities and capital"
test.
9. FLA. STAT. § 607.211(4) (1977).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 607.017(2).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 607.017(4).
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of the distributing corporation. 4 Insolvency is defined as the
"inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due in
the usual course of business."' 5 The insolvency prohibition on corpo-
rate distributions is, therefore, based upon a cash flow test. Because
of the interrelationship between the solvency of the corporation and
its statutory duty to pay dividends and redeem shares, attempts to
forestall corporate creditors through bookkeeping and balance sheet
maneuvers may later be deemed admissions of insolvency, and may
be used to void corporate distributions prohibited during insol-
vency.
Prohibitions against equity preferences are also included in the
new Act. A corporation may not purchase or pay for its own shares
if such a redemption or payment would reduce the net assets of the
corporation to the extent that the remaining aggregate net assets are
not sufficient to redeem other outstanding redeemable shares hav-
ing equal or prior rights to the assets of the corporation upon liqui-
dation. 6
The new Act also prohibits certain distributions of corporate
assets to shareholders during liquidation. Before filing the articles
of dissolution, a corporation must collect its assets, dispose of those
assets which are not to be distributed to shareholders in kind, and
either pay its liabilities or make provision for payment. Only after
this procedure has been completed may the remaining assets be
distributed to shareholders. 7
To protect against improper asset distribution, the Act provides
for express liability for directors in certain cases. A director who
either votes for or assents to a declaration of dividends, a redemp-
tion or other shareholder distribution in contravention of either the
Act or the articles of incorporation may be subject to liability. 8
Such a director, along with all other directors so voting or assenting,
is held to be jointly and severally liable to the corporation. 9 The
measure of recovery is determined by the amount of any excess
dividend or distribution above that which could have been legiti-
mately paid or distributed if the board had acted in compliance
with the law and its own articles of incorporation." Recovery is
14. Id. § 607.137.
15. Id. § 607.004(14).
16. Id. § 607.201. What is meant by the term "redeemable shares" is not defined under
the new Act, although it is probably safe to assume that it includes only shares which, by
their terms, are redeemable by the issuing corporation.
17. Id. § 607.261(3).





limited, however, to the amount of actual damage which any credi-
tor or shareholder has suffered.2
Unsatisfied corporate liabilities secured by distributed prop-
erty, for the payment of which no reserve is provided by the corpora-
tion, may, if unpaid, be satisfied out of the personal assets of direc-
tors.22 Various other acts involving possible "distributions" to share-
holders, such as a transaction in which a director-shareholder is
interested but which has not been properly approved,23 may also
constitute "distributions" to shareholders in violation of the provi-
sions of chapter 6074 and may consequently give rise to joint and
several liability on the part of directors.25
B. Repeal of the Fraudulent Conveyance Statute
The new General Corporation Act repealed former section
608.55, which stated in part:
No corporation which shall have refused to pay any of its notes
or other obligations when due, nor any of its officers or directors,
shall transfer any of its property to any of its officers, directors
or stockholders, directly or indirectly, for the payment of any
debt, or upon any other consideration than the full value of the
property paid in cash.2"
The section also prohibited any conveyance, assignment, or transfer
of any property, sufferance of judgment, giving of security or crea-
tion of lien by any officer, director or stockholder, where the corpo-
ration was insolvent or imminently insolvent, and where there ex-
isted an intent to create a preference to a particular creditor.27 In
addition, any party taking under any such prohibited transaction
would be liable to the creditors and stockholders, unless the rights
acquired were for valuable consideration and without notice or rea-
sonable cause to suspect the nature of the conveyance.28
It is argued that repeal of this provision creates a void in the
statutory scheme regulating corporate disbursements, one that may
create serious problems for creditors in a workout situation. While
those provisions of the new Act as previously discussed regulate
various forms of disbursements to shareholders, it appears that
21. Id.
22. Id. § 607.144.
23. Id. § 607.124.
24. Id. § 607.144(1)(a).
25. Id. § 607.144.
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transfers to nonshareholders, which were once regulated under the
broader wording of former section 608.55, are no longer required to
pass statutory muster. The same result may obtain for some forms
of transfers to shareholders where the shareholder takes as a creditor
or some other type of transferee.
In attempting to fill the void created by the repeal of section
608.55, practitioners in Florida should consider the example of cred-
itors' counsel from other jurisdictions who have increasingly revived
the common law trust fund doctrine to support their claims against
corporate debtors.
Although the common law trust fund doctrine is rather in-
choate,2 it has been described as follows:
Under the trust fund doctrine, regardless of the differences
among the authorities as to the full extent of its implications, it
is agreed by the decided weight if not by all of the comparatively
recent authorities, that if all of a corporation's assets are disposed
of without consideration or distributed among its shareholders, a
creditor of the corporation is entitled to pursue those assets on the
theory that the assets which he was entitled to look for satisfac-
tion have gotten into other hands under such circumstances as to
warrant the view that in equity they are burdened with a lien in
his favor.3
In essence, "the assets of the dissolved corporation are a trust fund
against which the corporate creditors have a claim superior to that
of the stockholders.'
It would appear that the common law trust fund doctrine covers
acts which lead up to insolvency and then follows the corporate
assets until they are transferred to a bona fide purchaser. It imposes
a constructive trust or equitable floating lien in favor of creditors.
Section 608.55 was an attempt to codify the "trust fund" doc-
trine. Indeed, in Hayes v. Belleair Development Co.,32 in discussing
chapter 10096, the predecessor to section 608.55, the Supreme Court
of Florida expressly stated: "The trust fund doctrine as thus stated
has been approved and is followed in many states and was incorpo-
rated into the law of this state by chapter 10096, § 43, Acts 1925
... ."3 The court continued, however, limiting the applicability of
the doctrine:
29. For a more complete discussion of the finer nuances of this doctrine, see Norton,
Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon Dissolution: Nature and Implica-
tions of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus. LAW. 1061 (1975).
30. Berwick v. Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Del. Ch. 265, 269, 174 A. 122, 123 (1934).
31. Koch v. United States, 138 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1943).
32. 120 Fla. 326, 162 So. 698 (1935).
33. Id. at 330, 162 So. at 699.
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It had not been approved nor followed here prior to thi's act....
Appellee having been organized under the law as it existed prior
to the enactment of chapter 10096, Acts 1925, its assets were not
a trust fund in the hands of its officers, but could become such
only when taken in hand by a court of equity for administration
which has not yet been done.3
While this pronouncement would tend to indicate that, since
the repeal of section 608.55, no claim under the trust fund doctrine
would be entertained by Florida courts, it is argued that there exists
considerable authority to support imposition of the common law
trust doctrine in the state.
Gray v. Standard Dredging Co.,35 the authority used by the
Hayes court, in turn relied upon two earlier decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Florida, Wheeler v. Matthews"5 and Guaranty Trust
& Savings Bank v. United States Trust Co.37 Yet, neither of these
decisions appears to deny that, when some principle of equity so
mandates, the assets of an insolvent corporation may be adminis-
tered by the court for the benefit of creditors. The cases simply
indicate that the mere fact of corporate insolvency does not, in and
of itself, create a trust fund." While the Wheeler court did not find
the facts to require exercise of equity jurisdiction in favor of credi-
tors, the Guaranty Trust court did, stating:
When a corporation becomes insolvent, in the sense that it is
unable to pay its debts, while its assets do not ipso facto become
a trust estate as to which the corporation or its officers become
the trustees and the creditors the cestuis que trustent, so that it
may be administered as such by a court of equity, such assets
may be administered by a court of equity upon the theory that
they belong to the creditors rather than to the corporation when
the court of equity takes possession of them upon some recog-
nized principle of equity jurisdiction. The directors, however, of
an insolvent corporation occupy toward the creditors of the corpo-
ration a fiduciary relation in that the properties of the corpora-
tion constitute a fund for the payment of the corporation's debts
which fund the directors are charged with managing to the best
interests of the creditors.39
It should be noted that in Guaranty Trust, the court exercised
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. 109 Fla. 87, 149 So. 2d 733 (1933).
36. 70 Fla. 317, 70 So. 416 (1915).
37. 89 Fla. 324, 103 So. 620 (1925).
38. Id. at 330-31, 103 So. 2d at 622; Wheeler v. Matthews, 70 Fla. 317, 321-22, 70 So.
416, 418 (1915).
39. 89 Fla. at 330-31, 103 So. at 622 (emphasis added).
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equity jurisdiction over an already existing, contractually created
fund for the benefit of creditors. A similar situation occurred in
Beach v. Williamson,40 where the directors of an insolvent corpora-
tion had obtained a conveyance of all corporate property in ex-
change for a promise to pay the corporation's debts. While the court
in Beach based its finding of equity jurisdiction on fraud, it stated
more generally that directors of a corporation are "bound to exercise
diligence and good faith in dealing with the properties of the corpo-
ration, to the end that the creditors' interests may be protected.""
No such finding of fraud or a contractually created fund for the
benefit of creditors was required by the court in Forcum v.
Symmes.42 While the result in Forcum could have been reached on
statutory grounds, the court apparently chose to exercise its equity
jurisdiction. In so doing it nullified a transaction in which, pursuant
to a directors' resolution, promissory notes, mortgages and other
security were returned to stockholders who in turn transferred their
stock certificates to the corporation. The court, citing Beach and
Guaranty Trust, reasoned that the defendant officers and directors
had failed to exercise diligence and good faith in managing the
property of the corporation, and had thus impaired the interests of
creditors.
43
Finally, it should be noted that former section 608.55 was not
specifically singled out for repeal by the legislature; rather, it was
repealed as part of a general repeal of chapter 608.11 While the repeal
of section 608.55 leaves the status of the trust fund theory in doubt,
favorable language in Wheeler, Guaranty Trust, Forcum and Beach,
as well as widespread utilization of the doctrine in a number of other
jurisdictions," provides a basis for arguing for the imposition of a
floating lien in favor of creditors upon the assets of an insolvent
Florida corporation.
C. Certain Partnership Arrangements
An examination of partnership cases, in which the status of
individual partners as creditors is discussed, indicates that a part-
ner may not share in the assets of the partnership with third party
40. 78 Fla. 611, 83 So. 860 (1920).
41. Id. at 620-21, 83 So. at 863.
42. 106 Fla. 510, 143 So. 630 (1932).
43. Id. passim.
44. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250 amending FLA. STAT. §§ 608.01-.77 (1973).
45. See, e.g., United States v. F.D. Rich Co., 437 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1970); Snyder v.
Nathan, 353 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1965); King v. Coosa Valley Mineral Prod. Co., 283 Ala. 197,
215 So. 2d 275 (1968); Zinn v. Bright, 9 Cal. App. 3d 193, 87 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Ct. App. 1970);
Wortham v. Lachman-Rose Co., 440 S.W. 2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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creditors. In In re Effinger, 46 the court clearly enunciated this princi-
ple, stating:
So far as I have been able to discover, the reports do not
disclose more than five cases in which it has been claimed that
the partner or his individual estate could participate in the distri-
bution of the firm assets in competition with firm creditors.
Wherever the claim has been made, it has been denied.
A partner cannot swell the assets of his firm by contrib-
uting money or property to it, and then, when the firm becomes
insolvent, assert, either in his own interest or that of his individ-
ual creditors, that what he had put into the firm was a mere loan
to it, and was not part of its assets. 7
To avoid the problem discussed above, it has become common
for those contemplating dual creditor-partner status to make the
loan to the partnership from a parent corporation, and to form a
subsidiary of the parent-creditor to serve as partner. This, of course,
raises the possibility that the corporate veil may be pierced. The
Florida courts have held that in the parent-subsidiary situation, the
circumstances surrounding the relationship may be such that one
corporation may be the mere instrumentality or agent of another to
the extent that the legal identity of the corporations is the same.
Although the plaintiff creditor did not succeed in piercing the corpo-
rate veil in Mayer v. Eastwood-Smith & Co.,"8 the Supreme Court
of Florida indicated that the courts will impose individual liability
where "the corporation was a mere device or sham to accomplish
some ulterior purpose, or is a mere instrumentality or agent of an-
other corporation or individual owning all or most of its stock, or
where the purpose is to evade some statute or to accomplish some
fraud or illegal purpose."4
In the case of State ex rel. Continental Distilling Sales Co. v.
Vocelle,50 which involved liquor licensing, the court sought to limit
the sweeping statements made in Mayer:
Corporations are legal entities by fiction of law. Their purpose is
generally to limit liability and serve a business convenience.
Courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil and only in ex-
ceptional cases will they do so. Such instances are for fraud as
46. 184 F. 728 (D. Md. 1911).
47. Id. at 731, 734.
48. 122 Fla. 34, 164 So. 684 (1935).
49. Id. at 43, 164 So. at 687. See also Mabel Whayne v. Transp. Mgt. Serv., Inc., 252 F.
Supp. 573 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
50. 158 Fla. 100, 27 So. 2d 728 (1948).
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where creditors are misled and defrauded or where the corpora-
tion is created for some illegal purpose or to commit an illegal
act.
51
While the language in Mayer should serve as a caution to coun-
sel structuring a dual creditor-partner status transaction, it is clear
that the restrictive language in Continental Distilling more closely
represents the general view in Florida and other jurisdictions.
III. BANKING AND CORPORATE LAW CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Florida Banking Code and Non-Florida Banks
A significant number of workouts of Florida real estate projects
involve indebtedness to a non-Florida bank. Substantial problems
may arise for the out-of-state bank in attempting to restructure
indebtedness of Florida entities because of restrictive banking code
provisions which severely limit the activities in which a non-Florida
bank may engage in Florida.
The Florida Banking Code" requires that a certificate of au-
thority be secured under section 659.05(3)(a)53 before banking or
trust business may be done in Florida. Such a certificate will not
be issued to a non-Florida corporation. Out-of-state banks engaging
in activities in Florida may, therefore, engage only in activities not
requiring a certificate of authority.
Sections 659.5711 and 660.101 provide limited lists of activities
which may be undertaken within Florida by out-of-state banks and
trust companies, without being deemed the conduct of banking or
trust business in Florida. Included in the permitted list is a broad
range of transactions designed to enable out-of-state lenders to pro-
tect their interests in collateral securing loans made in Florida. In
general, section 659.57(1)(c)55 allows a non-Florida bank lender to
deal with, manage or convey property in Florida which it has ac-
quired as security for, or in satisfaction of, obligations otherwise
acquired in accordance with the provisions of the section.
51. Id. at 102, 27 So. 2d at 729 (emphasis added). For a case in which the veil of a joint
venturer was pierced, see Lurie v. Arizona Fertilizer & Chem. Co., 101 Ariz. 482, 421 P.2d
330 (1966), where the court found a lack of corporate authority to enter into the joint venture,
undercapitalization of the corporate venturer and possible fraud on the part of the stockhold-
ers in creating the impression that they were joint venturers. See also Aztec Motel, Inc., v.
State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971) (citing Mayer v. Eastwood-Smith & Co.,
122 Fla. 34, 164 So. 684 (1935)).
52. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 658.01-.11, 659.01-.67, 660.01-.23, 661.01-.44 (1977).
53. Id. § 659.05(3)(a).
54. Id. § 659.57.
55. Id. § 660.10.
56. Id. § 659.57(1)(c).
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It is apparent that the only loan transaction in which a non-
Florida bank may participate under the terms of section 659.57 is
an arrangement which has been made in Florida by an entity other
than the out-of-state bank and which has been acquired by the out-
of-state bank by assignment or participation. Security interests re-
lating to any such loan may also be acquired, but only by assign-
ment or participation.
Sections 659.57 and 660.10 of the Banking Code, however, do
not readily accomodate a variety of workout formats. The extension
of new credit in connection with a workout arrangement, for exam-
ple, may not be permissible if new notes and separate security are
involved. Consolidation of indebtedness and rearrangement of out-
of-state participations in the indebtedness may also run afoul of
section 659.57.
While sections 659.57 and 660.10 clearly place definite con-
straints on the flexibility of a non-Florida bank in the workout con-
text, certain changes wrought by the new corporation act may serve
to expand the forms of activity in which these banks may engage.
Until January 1, 1976, chapter 613 of the Florida Statutes ap-
plied to the transaction of business in Florida by out-of-state corpo-
rations, with the explicit exception of banks and trust companies."
Effective January 1, 1976, chapter 613 was repealed, and relevant
provisions were included in the new General Corporation Act.5" The
new Act includes a list of activities which are deemed not to consti-
tute the transaction of business in Florida by a foreign corporation.59
But, unlike former chapter 613, the new Act does not specify that
foreign banks and trust companies may not qualify to do business
in Florida under the general provisions of the law relating to the
qualification of out-of-state corporations.
In spite of this apparent omission, it is unlikely that an out-of-
state bank or trust company could qualify to do traditional banking
or trust business in Florida under section 607.3040 of the new corpo-
ration act. It would appear, however, that the inclusion of the list
of activities of out-of-state corporations deemed not to constitute
doing business in Florida, and the absence of specific exemption of
out-of-state banks and trust companies from the application of this
section could bolster the argument that the provisions of sections
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 613.01-11 (1975) (repealed by Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250).
58. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 607.304-.367 (1977).
59. Id. § 607.304(2). Examples of activities which are deemed not to constitute the
transaction of business in this state by a foreign bank include: (a) maintaining or defending
any action or suit in this state; (b) holding meetings of its directors or shareholders in this
state; and (c) maintaining bank accounts in this state.
60. Id. § 607.304.
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659.57 and 660.10 are nonexclusive and that different definitions as
to what constitutes transacting business in Florida should not be
applied to out-of-state banks and trust companies.
If this is the case, then the new list of activities in which a
foreign corporation is permitted to engage in Florida without quali-
fication to do business here, as set forth in section 607.304,1 may
provide some standards for judging the permissible scope of workout
formats which may be adopted by non-Florida banks with regard to
Florida loans. In this connection, the section indicates that a foreign
corporation will not be deemed to be transacting business in Florida
by engaging in the following activities:
(g) Creating, as borrower or lender, or acquiring, indebted-
ness, mortgages, or other security interests in real or personal
property.
(h) Securing or collecting debts or enforcing any rights in
property securing the same.
(i) Transacting any business in interstate commerce.
(j) Conducting an isolated transaction completed within a
period of 30 days and not in the course of a number of repeated
transactions of like nature.2
It is argued that this broader view of the scope of permissible
non-Florida bank activity is in the public interest. By facilitating
workouts, projects will be salvaged, capital preserved and litigation
avoided. Tax revenue will be increased in the many instances where
the workout candidate eventually becomes profitable. Furthermore,
it would seem likely that an expansion of permissible activities by
non-Florida banks would increase the flow of capital into the state
both within and without the workout context.
Even if a certain activity appears to be in violation of the Flor-
ida Banking Code, it may be argued that the violation may not
impair the validity of the transaction involved, since there are no
provisions of the Banking Code which indicate that transactions in
violation of the provisions of the Code are void or voidable. Still, an
injunction may be secured against any such violator and, in the case
of an act or omission expressly declared to be unlawful or a criminal
offense under the provisions of the Banking Code, the violator may
be found guilty of a second degree misdemeanor. 3
In an attempt to avoid the difficulties created by the limita-
tions imposed on the activities of out-of-state banks in Florida by
the Banking Code, out-of-state banks engaged in workout transac-
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. §§ 659.55-56.
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tions sometimes structure them so that wholly owned nonbank sub-
sidiary corporations, which presumably are not subject to the re-
strictions of the Banking Code on lending activities in Florida, and
which may qualify to do business in Florida or which are qualified
to do business here, acquire interests in the workout or manage the
property involved. If a subsidiary which is qualified to do business
in Florida is utilized, it will be subject to the Florida corporate
income tax. 4
In the event that an out-of-state bank itself manages or retains
an interest in the workout, the bank will be subject to Florida in-
come tax on taxable income apportioned to Florida only if all of the
bank's tax base attributable to Florida activities is not subject to
taxation by the state of its domicile. 5 This represents a departure
from previous law which flatly exempted an out-of-state bank from
taxation in Florida.
6
B. Accommodations and Guarantees
Problems involving guarantees and accommodations may arise
in both stages of the workout process. During the first stage, guaran-
tors and accommodation parties will want to consider defenses to
claims made against them in those capacities. During the second
stage of the workout process, the creditor parties may seek guaran-
tees or accommodations from entities affiliated with the debtor.
The general rule is that in the absence of specific authority to
the contrary in either its certificate of incorporation or its bylaws, a
corporation does not have the power to become an accommodation
party or maker on a note. 7 In the absence of statutory authority,
there is no implied authority for such power.
Two Florida cases dealt indirectly with this problem. In J.
Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp.,8 Virginia-
Carolina executed a note as an accommodation maker for another
company in favor of a payee who knew of the accommodation nature
of Virginia-Carolina's execution. In holding that the payee had no
cause of action against the corporate accommodation maker, the
court indicated that an agent or an officer of a corporation has no
implied authority to bind the corporation by an accommodation
64. Id. § 220.11. The subsidiary's taxable income will be apportioned to Florida by means
of a formula which ascribes a weight of 50% to Florida sales, 25% to Florida payroll and 25%
to Florida property. See id. § 220.15.
65. Id. § 220.69.
66. FLA. STAT. § 220.61 (Supp. 1972)(repealed by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-152).
67. 6 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2631 (rev. perm.
ed. 1968).
68. 118 Fla. 258, 159 So. 39 (1934).
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endorsement; that, even assuming that the corporation had power
to execute negotiable paper, the issue of a note for accommodation
is an abuse of power when paper is issued without authority; and
that, as a consequence, the right of the holder to recover depends
on whether he was ignorant of the fact that the paper was for accom-
modation and was otherwise a holder in due course."
A similar question was considered in Citizens' National Bank
of Fernandina v. Florida Tie & Lumber Co.,70 in which the lumber
company's treasurer executed three promissory notes payable to a
partnership in which he was a partner. The partnership indorsed the
notes before maturity to plaintiff, Citizens' Bank, which discounted
the notes and later sued the lumber company on the notes when
they were not paid at maturity. The court charged Citizens' with
knowledge of the fact that the treasurer had no authority from the
lumber company to execute the notes since Citizens' had transacted
a significant amount of business with the treasurer in his alternate
capacity as a partner. The notes were accommodation notes for the
purpose of lending the lumber company's credit to the partnership
with no consideration being received by the lumber company. Thus,
the plaintiff was not a holder in due course and was not entitled to
recover on the notes from the defendant lumber company.
In reaching this decision, the court in Citizens' rather crypti-
cally assumed that the issuance of accommodation paper by a cor-
poration is not strictly an ultra vires act, but rather an act which
merely exceeds the limit of the corporation's power and that the
paper so issued is valid in the hands of a bona fide holder.7'
Section 3-415 of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vides that "[a]n accommodation party is one who signs the instru-
ment in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another
party to it."72 It further provides that when the instrument has been
taken for value before it is due, the accommodation party is liable
in the capacity in which he has signed even though the taker knows
of the accommodation. It might be argued that this section should
be construed as the requisite statutory authority to permit a corpo-
ration to act as an accommodation party.
This approach has failed elsewhere. In a New York decision,
Oppenheim v. Simon Reigel Cigar Co.,73 a bank discounted notes
which had been indorsed by the payee, Simon Reigel, for the maker.
69. Id. at 270, 159 So. at 43.
70. 81 Fla. 880, 89 So. 139 (1921).
71. Id. at 900-01, 89 So. at 143.
72. FLA. STAT. § 673.415(1) (1977).
73. 90 N.Y.S. 355 (App. Div. 1904).
[Vol. 32:979
CORPORATE WORKOUTS
The bank later assigned the notes to the plaintiff, but the indorse-
ment was found to be for accommodation and not within the corpo-
ration's power. The New York court held that a corporation which
is otherwise without power to make an accommodation indorsement
is not provided such power by a statute defining an accommodation
party and providing that such person is liable on the instrument to
a holder for value, though such holder takes with knowledge that the
corporation is only an accommodation party.74
While the law appears settled that a parent corporation may
guarantee the obligations of its subsidiary,75 it is unclear whether a
subsidiary may guarantee the obligations of a sister corporation or
of the parent. The latter arrangement involves the guarantee by a
corporation of the debts of a shareholder, a practice forbidden in a
number of jurisdictions."
The new Florida General Corporation Act has not resolved this
issue. While both the old and the new Acts indicate that Florida
corporations may issue guarantees and mortgage their property," it
would appear that such language is merely intended to be enabling,
and that the arrangement must be supported by fair consideration
or have an otherwise valid business purpose. A liegro v. Pan Ameri-
can Bank" implicitly espouses this view. There, the question was
whether a parent corporation could validly guarantee the value of
the assets of an eighty percent owned subsidiary in order to avert
possible Federal Reserve Board action. On these facts, the court
found that the parent's interest in the subsidiary empowered the
corporation to make the guaranty and was sufficient consideration
to permit its full enforcement. Had the statute alone been sufficient
to fully supply the guarantee power, the court's discussion would
have been unnecessary.79
There are no Florida cases to date discussing whether a subsidi-
ary may guarantee the obligations of its parent or of a sister corpora-
tion. However, the commentaries to the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, from which the Florida provisions regarding corporate
powers were derived, point out that "most of the cases, particularly
74. A similar conclusion was reached in New Hampshire Nat'l Bank v. Garage & Factory
Equip. Co., 267 Mass. 483, 166 N.E. 840 (1929).
75. Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 149 So.
2d 45 (Fla. 1963).
76. Crossland-Cullen Co. v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 133 F. Supp. 473 (W.D.N.C.),
rev'd on other grounds, 234 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1955); In re Romadka Bros. Co., 216 F. 113
(7th Cir. 1914).
77. Compare FLA. STAT. § 608.13(9)(a) (1975)(repealed 1976) with FLA. STAT. §§
607.011(2)(c) and 607.237 (1977).
78. 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963).
79. See id. at 662-64.
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the older cases, which have held guarantees invalid, were based on
the ultra vires theory."8 The courts, in view of that theory's decline,
gradually turned to the doctrine of consideration as the validating
criterion. Today, the criterion should be less technical. Guarantees
should be upheld if it is shown that the board of directors of the
guarantor had in good faith, and in the exercise of reasonable busi-
ness judgment, decided that the benefits derived from the guaran-
tees were sufficient to justify the liability incurred.
Section 3-416 of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code,8 which
deals with guarantees, indicates that a holder of guaranteed negoti-
able paper may, as in the case of a holder of an instrument executed
by an accommodation maker, have an enforceable obligation. Fur-
thermore, section 607.021 of the Florida Corporation Act states in
its preamble: "No act of a corporation . . . shall be invalid by
reason of the fact that the corporation was without capacity or
power to do such act or to make or receive such conveyance, trans-
fer, or encumbrance. ... 1 These two statutes, taken together
with section 3-415, dealing with accommodation parties, would ap-
pear to limit the usefulness of an ultra vires defense to debtors in a
potential workout situation.
Certain other provisions of section 607.021, however, enumerate
limited circumstances under which the lack of corporate power may
be asserted as a defense. This may give rise to very significant
liabilities during the second stage of the workout process, when
guarantees or accommodations may be sought by creditors.83 Thus,
for those who seek to implement a workout, the corporate power
question presented by subsidiary guarantees and accommodations
remains open.
C. Substantial Disposition of Assets
Not infrequently the implementation of a workout arrangement
will include passage of a deed in lieu of foreclosure to the creditors.
80. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 4(h), comment (1960).
81. FLA. STAT. § 673.416 (1977).
82. Id. § 607.021.
83. Section 607.021 states that lack of corporate power may be asserted:
(1) In a proceeding by the corporation, whether acting directly or through
a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, or through shareholders in a
representative suit, against the incumbent or former officers or directors of the
corporation.
(2) In a proceeding by the Attorney General, .... to dissolve the corporation
or in a proceeding by the Attorney General to enjoin the corporation from the




Very often, the deeded property constitutes all or substantially all
of the debtor's assets.
Section 607.241 of the new General Corporation Act requires
approval by directors and shareholders in the event of a "sale, lease,
exchange, or other disposition of all, or substantially all, the prop-
erty and assets of a corporation, with or without the good will."' 4
A deed in lieu of foreclosure conveying a substantial portion of
the operating assets or property of a corporation would probably
constitute a "sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition," 5 thus re-
quiring approval by the directors and shareholders. Less certain is
the question of what other types of arrangements would constitute
an "other disposition" requiring shareholder approval, although it
is clear that the directors of a corporation alone may mortgage all
of its assets." Potential individual liability of directors under the
new General Corporation Act for ultra vires acts of a corporation"7
suggests that director and shareholder approval must be secured
where there is any reason for doubt.
While there are no Florida cases construing the meaning of the
term "substantially all," cases from other jurisdictions interpreting
similar language indicate that the courts may scrutinize both the
amount of assets and their nature, placing special emphasis upon
assets that are necessary to the conduct of normal corporate af-
fairs.8
The new Act permits shareholders to dissent from "[a]ny sale
or exchange of all or substantially all of the property and assets of
the corporation, including a sale in dissolution." 8 It is unclear
whether the language providing that "lease or other disposition" of
all or substantially all the assets requiring shareholder approval
under section 607.241 was intentionally deleted from the section
pertaining to dissenting shareholders' rights. In the absence of any
authority, one might speculate whether a deed in lieu of foreclosure
would be subject to the dissenters' rights.
IV. SECURITIES LAWS: STATE AND FEDERAL
The ambit of the securities laws is such that few substantial
efforts to raise capital escape their application. Since a large num-
84. Id. § 607.241.
85. See id.
86. Id. § 607.237.
87. Id. § 607.021.
88. See Id. § 607.241. For example, in Stiles v. Aluminum Prods. Co., 338 Ill. App. 48,
86 N.E.2d 887 (1949), a corporation which retained only incidental assets, but which disposed
of most, if not all, operating assets, was deemed to have sold "substantially all" its assets.
89. FLA. STAT. § 607.244 (1)(b) (1977).
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ber of workout situations encountered in Florida involve real estate
projects, they constitute a useful illustration of the wide range of
securities problems that must be anticipated by the practitioner.
If a transaction involves a "security," the state'" and federal',
regulatory frameworks become operative. Unless the security or the
transaction in which it is distributed falls within one of the specific
statutory exemptions,"2 the issuer must register with the appropriate
state and federal agencies. 3 In addition, regardless of whether or not
the security needs to be registered, the issuer must ensure that every
material fact which a reasonably prudent investor would consider
in connection with the sale or purchase of said security is disclosed. 4
Furthermore, all persons who sell or offer for sale securities for the
account of another must be registered at both the state 5 and fed-
eral 6 levels, unless specifically exempted. Failure to comply with
these regulatory requirements may result in severe penalties, both
civil and criminal.
9 7
A. What is a Security?
The regulatory framework does not, for the most part, become
relevant unless a threshold determination is made that the item sold
constitutes a security. Both the Florida and federal securities laws
define a security in such a broad manner that the practitioner must
take great care to ensure that the instrument offered for sale does
not fall within the statutory intendment. In addition, judicial con-
struction has served to expand the definition still further.
In the landmark case of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,9 the Supreme
90. See Id. §§ 517.01-.363 (1977).
91. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-80b-20 (1976).
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (1976); FLA. STAT. §§ 517.05-.06 (1977).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1976); FLA. STAT. § 517.07 (1977).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976); FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1977).
95. FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1977).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
97. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77t, 77x, 78r (1976); FLA. STAT. §§ 517.16, .21-23,
.302 (1977).
98. See FLA. STAT. § 517.02(1) (1977). The federal provision is almost identical, and it
provides that a "security" is
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certif-
icate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, tranferable share, invest-
ment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guar-
antee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
99. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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Court of the United States held that an "investment contract" is
the investment of money with the expectation of profits to come
solely through the efforts of others. This construction, together with
the statutes' literal language, has often resulted in the classification
of interests distributed in workout arrangements as securities.
Since state law provides for the forfeiture of a limited partner's
limited liability if he participates to any extent in the management
or operation of the partnership, 00 limited partnership interests are
almost by definition passive investments and, thus, securities.
Moreover, even general partnership interests may be treated as se-
curities if the operation or management of the property is vested in
less than all of the general partners or in a third party.'0 ' Interests
in a joint venture become securities if the operation or management
is handled in a similar fashion. The same result occurs in an agree-
ment under which a seller of an undivided interest in real property
retains control and overall management of the property.'02 As one
may observe, common to these arrangements is a delegation of con-
trol to someone other the investor, thus bringing the transaction
squarely within the Howey framework. On the other hand, no secu-
rity will be involved where the buyer and the seller structure the
transaction so that the seller retains no management rights and does
not participate in any future benefits, and where the owners agree
that any act affecting the entire enterprise must be approved by a
majority.0 3
Certain instruments not commonly recognized as securities
may, under the circumstances of a particular transaction, assume
such a status. For example, a written letter of commitment was held
to be a security where the letter purported to provide a first mort-
gage and was subsequently "sold for a substantial consideration,"
the buyer receiving what appeared to be an enforceable obligation
which contemplated the holding of funds. 04 Similarly, the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission has viewed a guarantee to purchase a
security as itself a security. 0 5
100. See FLA. STAT. § 620.07 (1977); Murphey v. Hillwood Villa Assoc., 411 F. Supp. 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
101. See, e.g., Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
102. SEC No-Action Letter [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,882.
103. See, e.g., SEC v. Royal Hawaiian Management Corp., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,982 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
104. United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
See also Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1968), holding that a commitment to issue
a security is itself a security.
105. Georgia Int'l Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,810.
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Another aspect of the foregoing problem is the characterization
of notes issued by an obligor as part of the workout. Section 3(a)(3)
of the Securities Act of 1933106 exempts from registration notes is-
sued to finance current transactions. According to the SEC, this
exemption "applies only to prime quality negotiable commercial
paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the public."'' 7 Section
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341° also excludes from
its definition of a security "any note . . . which has a maturity at
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." Federal courts,
in determining whether or not notes are securities, have begun to
apply a more elastic test, focusing on whether the note is predomi-
nantly "commercial" or "investment"100 in character, rather than
with reference to any mechanical standards set forth in the federal
laws.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
been especially active in this area, beginning with Bellah v. First
National Bank of Hereford"' in 1974. In Bellah, the Fifth Circuit
stated that maturity alone was not determinative of the nature of
an instrument issued under the 1934 Act. Looking to the intention
of the issuer, the court found no investment intent and thus held
that the notes offered were not securities. Later, in SEC v. Conti-
nental Commodities Corp., "' the Fifth Circuit set forth several fac-
tors as relevant in determining whether an instrument should be
considered as exempt commercial paper or nonexempt investment
paper: (1) whether the notes are prime quality; (2) whether they
were used to finance current transactions; (3) whether they were
offered to the public; and (4) whether they could be discounted by
a Federal Reserve Bank."2 Applying these factors to the situation
before it, the court held that notes maturing in less than nine
months issued by a broker to its customers as partial reimbursement
for losses sustained by them in connection with discretionary trad-
ing accounts and commodity options were nonexempt securities.
Within a week of Continental Commodities, a different Fifth Circuit
panel completed the picture by holding that notes maturing more
than nine months after issuance were not securities under the 1934
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1976).
107. SEC Release No. 33-4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158-59 (1961).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
109. See, e.g., Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
110. Id. The court also noted that the commercial paper exemptions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts were basically identical and, therefore, the standards developed under the former could
be applied to the latter. Id. at 112.
111. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
112. Id. at 525.
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Act definition."' The court expressly stated, "the investment or
commercial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability of the
Act, depriving of all utility the exemption based on maturity-
length.""'
B. "Offer or Sale"
If securities are involved in a workout, a second threshold ques-
tion arises before federal and state securities regulations apply;
whether the transaction involved the "offer or sale" of the security.
As with the term "security," "offer or sale" has been defined
broadly in the context of securities regulation."' No liability will
arise under the various securities acts unless the court finds that
either an offer or sale of a security has occurred.
Undoubtedly, the issuance of a security in payment of an obli-
gation is an issuance for value and, therefore, a sale within the
meaning of the 1933 Act. Moreover, a pledge of securities by a
pledgor may also constitute a sale, at least in the view of the SEC."'
Indeed, the mere exchange of securities for another interest, such as
a limited partnership interest, will be treated as a sale of a security,
whether new financing is contemplated or not."'
One problem which may be encountered in the workout context
is the possible treatment of a forfeiture as a sale, thus requiring full
disclosure of all material information and, possibly, registration. In
Murphey v. Hiliwood Villa Associates,"8 the United States district
court held that a sale occurred upon the operation of a relatively
common provision in a limited partnership agreement requiring
transfer of the limited partners' capital contribution to the general
113. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975). There, the court held that a $200,000 bank loan to a two-shareholder corporation,
evidenced by the corporation's one year promissory note, and secured by a pledge of stock,
was a commercial transaction not covered by the federal securities laws. For a discussion of
the securities implications involved in discretionary accounts, see Comment, Discretionary
Accounts, 32 U. MNUm L. REV. 401 (1978).
114. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975). See also Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing
Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene Security, A
Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEX. TE cH. L. REV. 25 (1975); Lipton & Katz,
"Notes" are not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763 (1975); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" are (are
not?) Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAW. 861 (1974); Comment, Commercial Notes and
Definition of 'Security' under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?,
52 NEB. L. REV. 478 (1973).
116. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976); FLA. STAT. § 517.02(3) (1977).
116. SEC v. National Banker's Life Ins., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,738.
117. United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1946).
118. 411 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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partner in the event of default by the limited partners upon their
obligation to make additional contributions of capital. In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted that under the 1934 Act, the defini-
tion of sale included a contract to sell, and that, although unconven-
tional, the transaction nonetheless involved "mutual promises," the
nonperformance of which gives rise to a remedy for breach."' More-
over, since the agreement provided for forfeiture upon the occur-
rence of certain conditions, there was thus a "contract to dispose of"
a security, thereby invoking the securities laws.'2
Counsel to a party to any workout transaction involving install-
ment payments should be aware that each payment pursuant to an
installment purchase contract for the purchase of a security is sub-
ject to the independent and individual satisfaction of the full disclo-
sure requirements of rule 10b-5.121 Under certain circumstances,
installment payment arrangements for the purchase of securities
have been held to involve individual and separate "sales" of securi-
ties. "' In this situation, each installment payment is separately sub-
ject to the registration requirements and other provisions of the 1933
Act.
C. Exemptions from Registration
Where there is an offer or sale of a security, the substantial
expense of registration may be avoided if the transaction qualifies
for one of the statutory exemptions. Moreover, in practice the exi-
gencies and economics associated with a normal workout result ei-
ther in the transaction being consciously structured to avoid regis-
tration or in registration being unnecessary through the use of an
exemption.
The two most popular exemptions are private placements 3 and
intrastate offerings.' 2' As a practical matter, use of these exemptions
requires compliance with SEC regulations specifically designed to
implement what the Commission feels the securities laws ought to
accomplish. '
119. Id. at 293.
120. Id.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977); see 4 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATON 2575 (2d ed.
Supp. 1969). See also United States v. Kormel Inc., 230 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D. Nev. 1964).
122. SEC v. Royal Hawaiian Management Corp. [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 91,982 (C.D. Cal. 1967); SEC v. North Am. Fin. Co., 214 F. Supp. 197 (M.D.
Ark. 1959).
123. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976); see FLA. STAT. § 517.06(10)
(1977).
124. Id. § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1976).
125. For private placements, SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1977), provides the
guidelines, while Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1970), is the standard for the intrastate
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Apart from the difficulty of compliance with the requirements
of both exemptions, there is the additional problem of integration.
Under certain circumstances, offerings which appear to qualify for
an exemption may be integrated with one another or with nonquali-
fled or registered offerings and thereby fail by reason of such inte-
gration.' 6 With respect to real estate syndications, the Commis-
sion's position appears to favor a finding of integration.
In summary, although a paramount consideration in a workout
is the avoidance of the costs and delay attendant to registration, the
establishment of an exemption will require the practitioner to pay
painstaking attention to detail, to prepare significant amounts of
documentation and to keep closely abreast of recent developments
in the field of securities regulation.
D. Broker-Dealer Registration
One of the most neglected areas of securities regulation, partic-
ularly in connection with real estate syndications, involves broker-
dealer registration. The general rule under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 is that any person who effects a transaction in securities
for the account of another must be licensed as a broker-dealer unless
specifically exempted.' 7 Especially pertinent to real estate syndica-
tion is the current SEC position that the professional syndicator
may be subject to registration because he is not viewed as falling
within the issuer exemption of the 1934 Act.' 8 In addition, an ad-
ministratively created exemption for holders of individual notes or
bonds secured by lien or real estate has been revoked by the SEC.'29
Furthermore, the intrastate exemption for broker-dealers whose
offering exemption. Even if the expressed provisions of the rules are followed, the Fifth Circuit
has stated that the general provisions of the rules will generally be used as a standard to
determine whether the issuer deserves the exemptions' protection. Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co.,
515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976). See also Doran
v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
126. The Preliminary Notes to both Rules 146 and 147, 17 C.F.R. 230.146-.147 (1977),
provide that the following factors will be considered:
(a) Whether the offerings are part of a single plan of financing;
(b) Whether the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security;
(c) Whether the offerings are made at or about the same time;
(d) Whether the same type of consideration is to be received; and
(e) Whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose.
It is submitted that a determination of whether the offerings in fact involve the same risk
would be a more useful standard, though the SEC has not, to date, concurred.
127. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976). See also FLA. STAT. §
517.12 (1977).
128. SEC Release No. 33-4877, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,705 (1967).
129. SEC Release No. 34-10828, 39 Fed. Reg. 19,944 (1974).
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business is entirely intrastate is lost forever by participation in any
single offering in interstate commerce.
E. Rule 10b-5
The pervasive effect of rule 10b-5'3° will be of concern in
workouts where the transaction is found to involve the purchase or
sale of securities. In the case of a troubled entity, it is often easy,
with hindsight, to find material omissions of fact which would have
forecast problems if properly disclosed.
The Florida analog to rule 10b-5 is contained in section 517.301
of the Florida Statutes (1977). That section, however, is to remain
in force only through July 1, 1980.'' In the meantime, it is impor-
tant to note that a successful action under the Florida fraud provi-
sion does not require a showing of scienter. This is contrary to fed-
eral law.'32
F. Business in Distress: Creditors' Liability
Section 15 of the 1933 Act 3 and section 20 of the 1934 Act'
34
extend potential liability for violations of the securities laws to
''control persons." A control person is one who possesses the power
to direct or cause the direction of management or policies.' 3 Liabil-
ity also attaches to aiders and abettors, and in this connection, the
court in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange'30 stated the basis
for such liability as follows:
[W]e would not go so far as to charge a party with aiding and
abetting who somehow unwittingly facilitated the wrongful acts
of another. Rather, to invoke such a rule investors must show that
the party charged with aiding and abetting had knowledge of or,
but for a breach of duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge
of the fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party failed
to act due to an improper motive or breach of a duty of disclo-
sure.'3
There appears to be a developing trend of authority indicating
that, under certain circumstances, liability may be asserted against
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
131. See 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, § 3(2)(w).
132. Compare Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) with Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Byrne, 320 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976).
135. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1975); Ferland v. Orange
Groves, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690, 707 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
136. 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
137. Id. at 374.
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a workout creditor as either a control person or as an aider and
abettor. To date, the Fifth Circuit has not so held, though some
convincing arguments have been made.'38 In Woodward v. Metro
Bank of Dallas, 131 where the defendant bank was alleged to be liable
as an aider and abettor in plaintiff's rule 10b-5 action, the court
affirmed a dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the defen-
dant lacked an awareness of fraudulent activity and did not know-
ingly assist in its furtherance. On the other hand, in Epprecht v.
Delaware Valley Machinery, Inc.,4 the court denied a creditor's
motion for summary judgment on a rule 10b-5 claim. The court
stated that the creditors would be primarily liable if the plaintiff
could prove that the creditors directly induced him to dispose of his
interest by: (1) misrepresenting or failing to disclose a material fact;
and (2) by doing so knowing that the truth had not been communi-
cated or with reckless disregard for the truth.' In addition, the
court held that the plaintiff could hold the defendant-creditors sec-
ondarily liable as aiders and abettors if he could prove: (1) an under-
lying securities fraud by the primary violators; (2) sufficient knowl-
edge of the fraud on the part of the creditors; and (3) that the
creditors rendered substantial assistance to the primary violators in
carrying out the securities fraud.'
G. Exemptions through Reorganizations
The Securities Act of 1933 facilitates the issuance of securities
in certain reorganizations. Section 3(a)(10)14 3 exempts the following:
Any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide
outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in
such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and condi-
tions of such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing
upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at which all per-
sons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange
shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or
agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial bank-
ing or insurance commission or other governmental authority
expressly authorized by law to grant such approval . .. .
138. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97-100 (5th Cir. 1975); Ferland
v. Orange Groves, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690, 708 (M.D. Fla. 1974). But see Carroll v. First Nat'l
Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
139. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
140. 407 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See also Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d
880, 886-89 (3d Cir. 1975).
141. 407 F. Supp. at 320.
142. Id. at 320, 322.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1976).
144. Id.
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In 1935, the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission issued an interpretative release, elaborating upon the
principal requirements for the availability of the exemption pro-
vided by section 3(a)(10).115 That release, whose guidelines are still
followed, provides that adequate notice of a hearing on the fairness
of the issuance of securities proposed to be issued under the exemp-
tion provided by section 3(a)(10) must be given to all persons to
whom it is proposed to issue such securities.'46 In order to conduct
a fairness hearing which will suffice for section 3(a)(10) purposes, a
state governmental authority (with the possible exception of a bank-
ing or insurance commission) must possess the express authority of
law to approve the fairness of the terms and conditions of the issu-
ance and exchange of the securities in question and to disapprove
terms and conditions because they are unfair either to those who are
to receive the securities or to other security holders of the issuer or
to the public."7 For purposes of the exemption provided by section
3(a)(10), a hearing by an authority expressly authorized by law to
hold such a hearing is adequate even though applicable state law
does not require such a hearing.
Section 3(a)(10) does not exempt resales by underwriters or
control persons of the reorganized company from registration, nor
does it exempt securities issued in a section 3(a)(10) transaction
from the application of the anti-fraud provisions of section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934."11
The practicalities of the implementation of the section 3(a)(10)
exemption are complicated by its apparent application to the offer
or sale of securities only after the requisite fairness hearing has been
held. Offers to creditors prior to such a hearing might violate the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act. Preliminary discussions
held exclusively with a creditors' committee might be exempt as
"preliminary negotiations," or as not constituting offers, since there
is no participation by those to whom the securities would be distrib-
uted."
H. "Bona Fide" Reorganizations
Section 517.06(4) of the Florida Statutes (1977) provides an
exemption from Florida registration for:
145. See Securities in Exchanges Approved by State Commissions, SEC Release No. 33-
312 (March 15, 1935), 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2181.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
149. See generally Stutman, Francis, Corotto & Glatt, Your Corporate Client is in Finan-
cial Difficulty and Solicits Your Advice, 28 Bus. LAW. 253, 257-58 (1972).
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[TIhe issuance of securities to . . . equity security holders or
other creditors of a corporation, trust, or partnership in the pro-
cess of a bona fide reorganization of such corporation or entity
made in good faith and not for the purpose of avoiding the provi-
sions of this part, either in exchange for the securities of such
equity security holders or claims of such creditors or partly for
cash and partly in exchange for the securities or claims of such
equity security holders or creditors ....
The Florida exemption is less formal than its counterpart in
section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, and requires no
"fairness" hearing. This provision, however, has been repealed,
effective July 1, 1980,110 and it remains to be seen how reorganiza-
tions will be treated subsequent to that date.
150. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, § 3(2)(w).
